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INTRODUCTION: THE DEEPWATER HORIZON 

INCIDENT 

Charles H. Norchi' 
On April 20, 20 10 an explosion occurred on the BP Deepwater 
Horizon offshore drilling rig in the Gulf of Mexico, killing eleven crew 
members, seriously injured sixteen, and sinking the rig. By July 15, 
when the oil flow was arrested, the Macondo well had discharged 4.9 
million barrels of oil into marine waters. 1 The continuing damage to the 
marine environment, the wider ecosystem, and to coastal human activity 
is still unknown. In this Symposium-The Gulf ofMexico Oil Spill: 
Impacts, Responses, and Prevention-the contributors appraise the 
regulatory and institutional pathologies that contributed to the incident, 
offer projections based on current practices and legal frameworks, 
propose alternative institutional and regulatory approaches, and 
recommend policies to achieve a preferred future for marine ecosystems 
and dependent human activity. 
There are earlier oil spill incidents that, in retrospect, amounted to a 
trend. Alan Sielen writing in this volume describes the 1969 Santa 
Barbara oil platform spill, the 1979 Bay of Campeche blowout in the 
Gulf of Mexico, the 1989 Exxon Valdez in Prince William Sound of 
Alaska, and the 2002 wreck of the tanker Prestige off the Spanish coast. 
However Deepwater Horizon is different. It is one of those rare marine 
environmental events that has acquired the characterization of an 
"incident," or a prism through which reactions at multiple levels can be 
assessed for acceptable risks and behavior, for systemic pathologies, 
policy preferences, and for alternatives in law, science, industry practice 
and policy. Through the incident prism, contributors to this symposium 
* Professor of Law and Director, Marine Law Institute, University of Maine School 
of Law. 
1. Campbell Robertson & Clifford Krauss, Gulf Spill Is the Largest of Its Kind, 
Scientists Say, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/03/us/ 
03spill.html?scp=1 &sq=Gulf0/o20 Spill %20Is%20the%20Largest%20of0/o20 Its%20Kind, 
%20Scient:ists%20Say&st=cse. 
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appraise natural resource damage assessment, collection and distribution; 
federal oversight of Outer Continental Shelf oil and gas activities; 
problems in spill response; the use of dispersants; renewable ocean 
energy resources; proposal for a department of the envirornnent; and 
fisheries conditions in the Gulf of Mexico. 
From the Symposium contributions, it is clear that the incident did 
not begin on April 20, 2010. The explosion was the culmination of a 
decision process that long predated that date and which now merits close 
parsing and appraisal. Future decision-makers and students of this event 
will want to know about the informational bases upon which prior 
decisions were made, the relevant legal prescriptions on the books at the 
time, the application of those prescriptions to behavior and events, 
procedures for handling substandard practices and behavior that lead up 
to the explosion, and the efficiency of regulatory agencies including any 
institutionalized practices for appraising internal processes and functions 
that could render decision-making in its entirety responsive and robust. 
Readers of this Symposium will find answers to those inquiries and be 
oriented to the events that cuhninated in the Deepwater Horizon incident 
and the context in which decisions were made. In tum, they will also 
find key aspects of the critical task of planning for, and hopefully 
averting, similar future incidents. 
The full impact of the event remains unknown. In her article, The 
Value of a Pelican: An Overview of the Natural Resource Damage 
Assessment Under Federal and Louisiana Law, Melissa Trosclair Daigle, 
Legal Coordinator, Louisiana Sea Grant Law & Policy writes the 
numbers of dead fish and fowl, "do not capture the true impact of the 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill. It is impossible to get an accurate count of 
the birds, fish, insects, reptiles, and mammals that died and sank to the 
ocean floor or decomposed unseen in the marsh, or of the microscopic 
organisms that inhabit the range of ecosystems that were affected by the 
spill." 2 Against this reality, she describes the Natural Resource Damage 
Assessment (NRDA) whose goal is "to make whole the natural resources 
and the public's loss of the use of those resources that are damaged or 
destroyed by the discharge of oil.',3 Ms. Daigle examines the unique 
challenges the complicated Deepwater Horizon spill presents to the 
assessment and recovery process that is unfolding pursuant to federal and 
state law. The incident did not merely generate immediately discernable 
2. Melissa Trosclair Daigle, The Value of a Pelican: An Overview of the Natural 
Resource Damage Assessment Under Federal and Louisiana Law, 16 OcEAN & CoASTAL 
L.J. 253,253-54 (2011). 
3. !d. at 246. 
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affects, but also post-outcome uncertainties that complicate the goal of 
making the envirornnent and the citizenry whole. 
In Shortcomings and Solutions: Reforming the Outer Continental 
Shelf Oil and Gas Framework in the Wake of the Deepwater Horizon 
Disaster, Andrew Hartsig, Arctic Program Director for Ocean 
Conservancy, observes that, "the Deepwater Horizon disaster revealed 
systemic weaknesses in the administration of oil and gas activities on the 
Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). It also underscored the difficulty of 
stopping and responding to a major oil spill, even in the relatively 
accessible and temperate waters of the Gulf of Mexico . . . . These 
shortcomings affected the full spectrum of OCS activities, from planning 
for OCS oil and gas lease sales, to administering offshore exploration 
and development activities, to planning and implementing oil spill 
response efforts."4 Systemic weaknesses contributed to ineffective 
decision-making. Mr. Hartsig describes the existing framework for 
federal oversight of OCS oil and gas activities, including oil spill 
preparation and response, and compliance with the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEP A). He then recommends detailed policy 
and legislative solutions that address flaws in the framework following 
the National Commission's recommendation of regulatory policies 
pertaining to the oversight of offshore drilling. 
In Deepwater Horizon Natural Resource Damage Assessment: 
Where does the Money Go?, Nicholas J. Lund, Ocean and Coastal Law 
Fellow at the National Sea Grant Law Center at the University of 
Mississippi and Niki L. Pace, Research Counsel with the Mississippi­
Alabama Sea Grant Legal program, continue the appraisal of the natural 
resource damages problem. Specifically, the authors treat the delicate 
issue of collection and distribution of restoration funds pursuant to the 
Oil Pollution Act of 1990. Via a review of prior experiences, they clarify 
some of the attendant controversies and uncertainties in a process whose 
goal is to ensure that the responsible party makes the envirornnent 
''whole" again. 
Russell V. Randle, a partner at Patton Boggs LLP, in Spills of 
National Significance and State Nullification, reveals certain deficiencies 
in the spill response and identifies factors at the core of the problem and 
means to adjust and correct them. He reviews responsible party issues, 
roles of state and federal goverrnnent, information deficiencies in 
decision-making, and enhanced response to avert nullification. After 
4. Andrew Hartsig, Shortcomings and Solutions: Reforming the Outer Continental 
ShelfOil and Gas Framework in the Wake ofthe Deepwater Horizon Disaster, 16 OcEAN 
& CoASTAL L.J. 269, 269-70 (20 11 ). 
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canvassing particular experiences, Mr. Randle recommends specific 
changes to the National Contingency Plan (NCP), the federal regulation 
governing oil and hazardous substance response, which could resolve 
nullification and related problems. He underscores the lessons that can 
be applied to future spill response planning to avoid repeating the errors 
of the Deepwater Horizon experience. 
In responding to a catastrophic oil spill, the treatment can render the 
patient worse. Catherine Kilduff and Jaclyn Lopez, staff attorneys at the 
Center for Biological Diversity, clarify this in their article, Dispersants: 
The Lesser ofTwo Evils or a Cure Worse than the Disease. Beginning 
with the decision to approve BP's use of subsea dispersant, they review 
the statutory framework for regulating dispersants, significant wildlife 
species and human impact, lessons from the Deepwater Horizon incident 
and the need for scientific investigation that could inform the application 
of existing laws and future policy adjustments. 
Yet the lifestyle demanded by most human beings living in the 
developed spaces of our planet has determined that we live in a 
hydrocarbon present. But is there an alternative energy future? Todd J. 
Griset, an attorney with the firm Preti Flaherty, addresses this possibility 
in Harnessing the Ocean's Power: Opportunities in Renewable Ocean 
Energy Resources. He provides an "overview of the opportunities for the 
production of usable power from ocean energy resources other than oil 
and gas, as well as the legal regimes applicable to, and policy questions 
relating to that production."5 Mr. Griset makes the case that renewable 
energy resources derived from the oceans is not merely a projection, but 
that technologies to extract usable power are available now. He 
describes ocean wind, marine hydrokinetic technologies, ocean thermal 
energy conversion and legal regimes applicable to each. Rendering 
renewable energy resources from the seas economically feasible requires 
incentives that Mr. Griset describes. These renewable resources may be 
nearer to our energy present owing to the Deepwater Horizon incident. 
The incident may also be a catalyst to reconsider the institutional 
framework for all envirornnental decision-making. Should such 
decision-making along with executive authority be located in a 
Department of the Envirornnent? Alan B. Sielen, Senior Fellow for 
International Envirornnental Policy at the Center for Marine Biodiversity 
and Conservation, in the Scripps Institution of Oceanography, makes the 
affirmative case for a new federal Department of the Environment. He 
asserts the Deepwater Horizon spill was preventable and addresses the 
5. Todd J. Griset, Harnessing the Ocean's Power: Opportunities in Renewable 
Ocean Energy Resources, 16 OcEAN & CoASTAL L.J. 395,396 (2011). 
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systemic industry and government failures at its roots. Mr. Sielen 
describes the problem of environmental decision-making dispersal across 
the government including conflicts among agencies. He describes how a 
Department of the Environment could resolve those problems and 
produce leadership that is now urgently required nationally and 
internationally. 
How do habitats and species recover from the effects of oil, methane, 
and dispersants? The problem of capacity recovery is explored by Ashley 
McCrea-Strub and Daniel Pauly of the University of British Columbia in 
their article Oil and Fisheries in the Gulf ofMexico. They explain that 
"estimates of the quantity of oil, natural gas and associated methane and 
chemical dispersants released as a result of this calamity has been 
plagued by uncertainty."6 Hence, it is difficult to project the long term 
impact on habitats and marine organisms. In the face of this difficulty, 
they offer an assessment of this uncertain future in a study that draws 
upon databases of spatially allocated fisheries data. Their work holds 
dire implications for commercial fisheries of the Gulf of Mexico. 
Appraising the Deepwater Horizon incident unveils demands and 
claims in what has been famously called The World Public Order of the 
Oceans7 This is a process in which nation-states and many other 
participants including corporations, navies, scientific organizations, 
NGOs, and individuals assert ocean demands and claims that generate 
outcomes embodied in regulations, court decisions and events, some of 
which are catastrophic. Even when the process unfolds within the 
jurisdiction of a coastal state, the impact is eventually global and it 
affects world public order. Thus, how a particular nation-state and its 
governmental agencies treat a critical ocean incident of national 
siguificance, is studied and appraised by decision-making elites 
elsewhere who also have national interests in the oceans and in the assets 
and resources that the seas might generate. This is especially relevant as 
new areas of continental shelf oil exploration open in the Arctic, Africa, 
Australia, Brazil and Russia. 
Among the nation-states whose elites appraise incidents of national 
siguificance, such as Deepwater Horizon, are China and India, two 
governments that intensely demand hydrocarbon resources. These 
societies are at stage of economic development that will shape their 
decision calculus. Their scale of values, including acceptable ecosystem 
6. Ashley McCrea-Strub & Daniel Pauly, Oil and Fisheries in the GulfofMexico, 16 
OcEAN & CoASTAL L.J. 473,473 (2011). 
7. MYRES S. McDoUGAL & WILLIAM T. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF TIIE OCEANS: 
A CoN1EMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAw oF TIIE SEA (Yale Univ. Press 1975) 
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risks, will be different than ours. Their vast populations, their drive for 
industrial development across multiple sectors, their energy-dependent 
military expansions are overwhehning factors in decisions affecting 
oceans usage including hydrocarbon extraction and marine ecosystem 
protection. And the connectivity of our oceans renders our 
environmental fates co-dependent. It is in the global common interest 
that these newly empowered players, these rising hydrocarbon 
civilizations, learn the lessons of the Deepwater Horizon incident. 
The Deepwater Horizon incident and the articles in this Symposium, 
also remind us of the scale of values of the mature hydrocarbon 
civilizations of the Americas and Europe. How is that scale to be 
balanced? What trade-offs are societies willing to accept? Is the value 
of envirornnental well-being which directly bears on human health, 
preferred over the value of wealth and its maximization derived from 
cheaper energy? Are individuals and households prepared to accept 
higher consumer product and fuel costs in return for greater 
environmental safeguards? Which commercial activity is to be 
favored--{)il and gas exploration with its attendant risks, or fisheries and 
ecotourism? The skill required to access resources deep within the 
continental shelf is available to highly developed nation-states and 
corporations within those nation-states. That investment in skill, in tum, 
contributes to the wealth and power of the nation-state. The defense of 
the homeland and the projection of military power are dependent on 
energy resources, mostly hydrocarbon. Are nation-states willing to 
sacrifice diminished power for the well-being of the marine 
environment? Is a healthy environment also a component of power­
what Joseph Nye has termed "soft power''? 8 How will those choices be 
made and who will make them? 
The Deepwater Horizon catastrophe generated a profoundly negative 
impact on the marine environment of the Gulf of Mexico including a 
range of coastal impacts bearing upon the human condition. It is a 
critical incident in the ocean and coastal law of the nation because it is 
shaping normative expectations at multiple social levels and with that, 
the decision-making calculus of political, legal, and corporate elites. 
Perhaps America is prepared for an adjustment in its scale of values, a 
post-Deepwater Horizon national self-scrutiny along with a clarification 
of broader goals and how to reach them. That is a latent theme of this 
Ocean and Coastal Law Journal Symposium. Our contributors to The 
8. JosEPH S. NYE, JR., SoFT PmvER: THE MEANS TO SuccEss IN WoRLD PoLmcs x 
(2004) ("Soft power . is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than 
coercion or payments."). 
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Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill: Impacts, Responses, and Prevention, have 
delivered more than scholarly appraisals of the Deepwater Horizon 
event Through the prism of that incident, they have provided normative 
guidance for current and future decision-makers. And every concerned 
reader of this volume is a potential decision-maker who can contribute to 
a preferred marine ecosystem future in the common interest 
